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INTRODUCTION

An ethical advancement of scientific knowledge demands a delicate
equilibrium between benefits and harms, in particular in health-related research.
When applying and advancing scientific knowledge or technologies, Article 4 of
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, ethically
justifiable research requires maximizing direct and indirect benefits, and minimizing
possible harms.1 The National Institution of Health [NIH] Data Sharing Policy and
Implementation Guidance similarly states that data necessary for drawing valid
conclusions and advancing medical research, should be made as widely and freely
available as possible (in order to share the benefits), while safeguarding the privacy
of participants from potentially harmful disclosure of sensitive information. 2 This
paper discusses the challenges in the maximization of research benefit and the
minimization of potential harms in the unique context of health-related research in
Big Data from multiple sources, which are differently protected by the law.
Part I frames the ethical dilemma by discussing potential benefits and
harms, showing the constant misalignment in health-related research in Big Data
from multiple sources, between the benefits in the use of confidential information for
scientific purposes, and the value in keeping confidentiality. In part II, the paper
addresses existing regulations, their nature and legal coverage. It highlights the
challenges prevailing when combining data from multiple sources that are differently
protected by the law. Part III compares different requirements for consent or
1
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005).
2

NIH, NIH Data Sharing Policy and Implementation Guidance
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/data_sharing_guidance.htm

(2003),
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authorization to use persons’ health information for research. It focuses on the
difficulty of existing regulation to ensure those requirements when using multiple
sources of data. Part IV investigates whether exemptions from the authorization
requirement could prevail in the context of information that exceeds the protection of
the HIPAA and the Protection of Human Subjects Regulations. In part V the paper
proposes a solution is of a statistical nature, using the method of synthetic data to
balance conflicting consideration. Part VI shows how the use of synthetic data can
overcome some of the ethical challenges.
II.

A DELICATE EQUILIBRIUM

The term “Big Data” is differently defined by users and policy makers.
What it means is dramatically different to the media, business, health, or academic
statistics communities, and to different regulatory bodies. 3 To our knowledge, there
is no gold standard definition. Big Data is considered data on a massive scale in
terms of volume, intensity, and complexity that exceed the ability of standard
software tools to manage and analyze.4 But also, “It is less about data that is big than
it is about a capacity to search, aggregate, and cross-reference large data sets.”5
Laney coined the definition in the Big Data analytics world: volume (amount of

3

Jordan JM & Lin DK, Statistics for Big Data: Are Statisticians Ready for Big Data?
INT’L CHINESE STAT. ASS’N BULL (2014) 52: 133; Vlasses F et al., Leveraging Technology for
Research, in NURSING INFORMATICS (2009), 692.
4
See, e.g., Snijders C et al., "Big Data": Big Gaps of Knowledge in the Field of Internet
Science, INT'L J. INTERNET SCI. (2012), 7: 1.
5

Boyd D & Crawford K, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural,
Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y (2012), 15: 662, 663.
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data), velocity (speed of data in and out), and variety (range of data types and
sources) – the 3V definition.6
As life is being recorded and quantified in ways hard to imagine a decade
ago, there is great promise in Big Data research, in particular for health purposes.
The literature often addresses medical records as the source for health-related
research in Big Data,7 for example, electronic records document multiple aspects of
medical care: quantitative and qualitative data of patients, imaging records,
providers’ documentation of health care delivery (medication and other services),
narratives and genetic information, all of which provide important information on a
person's physical condition.8 But as many details of our lives are documented and
easily available for analysis, a variety of nontraditional or even unstructured data
types contains different kinds of health-related information, which is combined with
traditional medical databases. Medical or genetic data can be connected to data
found on multiple sources: social media, surveillance videos, education, military
service, exercise regimens, credit card payments for physician visit co-pays, visits to
alternative practitioners, over the counter medications, home testing products,
tobacco products, diet habits, or leisure time preferences.9 Since a single database
may not provide a complete picture of a patient’s condition or health history,
combining information from multiple sources is often necessary and allows ways of

6
Laney D., 3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and
Variety, META GROUP RESEARCH NOTE 6 (2001), 70.
7

See, e.g., SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DATA:
LAW AND POLICY Vol. 32 (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
8
See, e.g., Fan J. et al., Challenges of Big Data Analysis, NATIONAL SCI. REV. (2014), 1:
293, 295.
9
Tasha Glenn & Scott Monteith, Privacy in the Digital World: Medical and Health Data
Outside of HIPAA Protections, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS 494(2) (2014).

91
BASSAN, THE ETHICS IN SYNTHETICS
research previously not possible through traditional methods performed on a narrow
spectrum of samples.10
On the one hand, health-related research combining multiple sources of Big
Data offers the potential to explore hidden structures of the data, and extract
important common features across data sets, in order to derive accurate results
regarding complex questions in real-time.11 Research can find correlation between
multiple contextual variables found in public databases without having to interview a
single patient.

It contributes to a better understanding of people’s life-style by

creating an observational and even dynamic analysis, even when there are significant
individual variations.12 Such research can open the door for the promising world of
personalized medicine and bring each individual customized treatments based on
evidence drawn from their own lives. It can lead to the improvement of efficiency of
health care delivery and public health decisions through standardized care and
advance medicine, while saving costs nationally and globally.
On the other hand, there is a constant conflict between the benefit of using
multiple sources of information and the value of preserving confidentiality of
medical information. The need to maintain patients’ privacy is an ethical obligation
inherent in the physician-patient relationship, believed to be essential in order to
generate better medicine – from diagnosis to treatment. The rationale underlying the
doctrine of confidentiality of medical information is to enable patients to benefit

10

Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy, Improving Health Through
Research, 177 (Lawrence O. Gostin, Laura A. Levit & Sharyl J. Nass, eds., 2009) (hereinafter
Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
11
12

Fan et al., supra note 8, at 294.

Murdoch TB & Detsky AS, The Inevitable Application of Big Data to Health Care, 309
JAMA 1351, 1351 (2013).
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from free and open communication regarding their status. Since information is
essential to treatment, it is of no wonder that health service providers have access to
all or portions of a patient's health records, however health care providers have a
duty to avoid disclosure of medical information they obtain. In legal terms, the
patient has a right of privacy, which aims to restrict the disclosure of confidential
information.13
While the classical physician-patient model requires that information will
be kept confidential, the more health information is present in electronic databases,
the harder it is to maintain the privacy of individuals who are the subject of such
information, and the greater is the potential misuse of information. Evidence of
confidentiality breaches exist in State agencies in the US, healthcare organizations, 14
as well as in private organizations. 15
Free communication is altered when patients fear that their sensitive health
information might be electronically disclosed. Such fear may compromise the health
13

For individual rights, see Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 10, at 160.

14
E.g., Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(6) (reviewing a survey of 91 healthcare
organizations, where 90 % reported at least one incident in the last two years while 38 %
reported more than five incidents. When including only breaches involving at least 500
individuals, over 29 million patient health records have been compromised since 2009.);
Goldman J, 91 Percent of Healthcare Organizations Suffered Data Breaches in the Past Two
Years, ESECURITY PLANET (May 12, 2015), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/networksecurity/91-percent-of-healthcare-organizations-suffered-data-breaches-in-the-past-twoyears.html (The Ponemon Institute found that 91% of healthcare organizations have suffered
at least one data breach since 2013, and 40% have suffered more than five); Hacker
Reportedly Selling Personal and Medical Data of 655,000 Patients, INSURANCE FRAUD NEWS
(June 27, 2016), http://www.insurancefraud.org/IFNS-detail.htm?key=22997 (In June 2016, a
hacker was reported to sell copies of databases stolen from three unidentified U.S. healthcare
organizations and one unnamed health insurer, containing data on nearly 10 million
individuals on the dark web or prices ranging from about $96,000 to $490,000 in bitcoin for
each database).
15

Goldman J, Data Breach at UCLA Health Exposes 4.5 Million People's Personal
Information, ESECURITY PLANET, (July 21, 2015), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/networksecurity/data-breach-at-ucla-health-exposes-4.5-million-peoples-personal-information.html
(According to the Department of Health and Human Services, more than 120 million people
have been compromised in more than 1,110 breaches since 2009 – a third of the U.S.
population.)
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care they seek. As studies show, for fear of disclosure to unauthorized persons,
patients may withhold information, giving an incomplete or misleading description
of their condition.16 In recent surveys, a substantial number of people said they
would withhold data from their physician due to privacy concerns related to
technology.17 Patients concerned with privacy violations are also less likely to seek
care or return for follow-up treatment. They may seek care outside of their provider
network, compromising the benefits of care coordination. 18
Achieving ideal privacy or attempting to eliminate all possible breaches of
confidentiality prevents society from the benefits inherent in research. However,
researchers are often unaware of potential harms, especially given the large presence
of health information in different sources of databases, some of which is voluntarily
provided by users.19 The next chapter reviews existing regulations, their nature and
legal coverage. It highlights the challenges prevailing when combining data from
multiple sources that are differently protected by the law.
III.

DIFFERENT SCOPES OF PROTECTIVE REGULATIONS

In the case of health-related research in Big Data, policies and regulations
should assure two dimensions of ethics: on the one hand, focused on harms, the

16

Sankar P et al., Patient Perspectives of Medical Confidentiality: A Review of the
Literature, 18 J GEN INTERN MED. 659 (2003).
17
Agaku IT et al., Concern about Security and Privacy, and Perceived Control Over
Collection and Use of Health Information are Related to withholding of Health Information
from Healthcare Providers, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASSOC. 374 (2014) (over 10% of
patients tend to withhold relevant medical information from their physicians).
18

Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(7) tb. 3; Scott C, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for
Your Health--An Introduction to the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17
GA. ST. UL REV. 481, 529 (2000).
19
Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(2) (e.g.,one-third of U.S. consumers use
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter for medical related discussions such as to check consumer
reviews).
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protection of information itself and of subjects whose information is used. On the
other, focused on benefit, that the benefit from the research overweighs potential
harms. The first dimension relates to confidentiality of personal information held in
databases, whether or not they are health-related, Big Data, publicly available, or
not. The second dimension addresses the equilibrium between privacy concerns and
benefits from the research. Research in health-related data from multiple sources
jeopardizes both aspects.
The legal frameworks addressing the release of data for health-related
research purposes differ in levels of protection in terms such as the scope of the
information covered and permitted disclosures: identified and de-identified
information, held by entities covered or non-covered by laws, different uses of
information, etc. This paper focuses on the HHS Protection of Human Subjects
Regulations, and the Privacy Rule of Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which represent the regulative framework of healthrelated research on the one hand, and of the operation of personal health information,
on the other.20
The Protection of Human Subjects Regulations are the leading guidelines in
ethical and regulatory issues in biomedical and behavioral research. According to
definitions in the regulations, research on a human being is a systematic
investigation, and research on a living individual about whom an investigator
conducting research obtains identifiable private information constitutes research in a
human being.21 Typically, this regulation have not been applied to the core

20
Protection of Human Subjects Regulations, 45 C.F.R. §46 (2007); The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), P.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1938
(1996).
21

45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d), (f).
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disciplines of Big Data (computing, mathematics, and statistics) because in healthrelated Big Data research, researchers frequently do not interact with the individual
subjects of their research. Big Data disciplines are assumed to be conducting
research on systems, not people.22 However, we chose to use them as reference due
to their health research orientation and concern for research subjects whose personal
health information is being used for research. These, we believe, should be guiding
rationales in health related research in Big Data as well.
HIPAA’s main goal is to assure that identified personal health information
of people who seek care is properly protected under national standards, while
allowing the flow of health information needed to provide and promote high quality
health care and public health. 23 The HIPAA strikes a balance between the benefit in
the use of information and safeguarding the privacy of individuals. Similarly to the
Protection of Human Subjects Regulations, HIPAA broadly defines research as any
“systematic investigation, including research development, testing, and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge”. 24 While the HIPAA
is inclusive of Big Data research in terms of the type of research, it is exclusive in
terms of types of information covered, and nature of coverage.
HIPAA’s scope is limited to covered entities (a health plan, a health care
clearinghouse, or a health care provider who transmits any Protected Health
Information (PHI) in electronic form25) in relation to treatment or healthcare
22

Metcalf J, Big Data Analytics and Revision of the Common Rule, 59 COMMUNICATIONS
(2016).

OF THE ACM, 31
23

Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.gov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2017).
24
25

45CFR § 164.501 (2007).

See 45 C.F.R. §160.103(4) (2007).
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operation. Medical information held by third parties is not protected under the
HIPAA.26 Researchers are not themselves covered entities, unless they are also
health care providers and engage in any of the covered electronic transactions.
However, researchers who are not themselves covered entities, or who are not
workforce members of covered entities, may be indirectly affected by the Privacy
Rule if covered entities supply their data. 27 Also, any information or analytics
derived from sources not subjected to HIPAA, although may be equally sensitive, is
not legally protected under HIPPA safeguards. 28
Health information used in research which combines multiple data bases
may differ in the regulation it is subjected to, since different sources of personal
information are differently regulated. Some may be subjected to more than one
legislation, thus protected, while others subjected to none. However, both types of
regulation specifically excludes two types of research, involving the collection of
publicly available sources of data, e.g. information in social media, as well as deidentified information, i.e. information that was recorded by the investigator in such
a manner that an individual subject could not be identified either directly or through
identifiers linked to the subject.29 Neither information people voluntarily share on

26

For example, 23andMe, a direct-to-consumer genetic testing enterprise, holds more than a
million people’s genetic data, and there sample bank is constantly expanding. Social media
and other commercial companies also have large Databases.
27

Health Services Research and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, NIH, 10, (May 20, 2005),
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/healthservicesprivacy.asp. Cf. HIPAA requires that any
entity which is subjected to the law will obtain satisfactory contractual assurances from its
business associates, stating that they will appropriately safeguard the PHI they receive or
create on behalf of the covered entity according the requirements specified under the Privacy
Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 160.300 (2007).
28

Coy K & Hoffman NW, Big Data Analytics Under HIPAA, LEGAL INSIGHT (2016)
http://www.agg.com/files/Publication/52c146ff-493e-41a9-84f9a014e091ebfb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/76dc5af9-fd45-4533-98ac5beed1010278/Coy-Hoffman-Big-Data-Analytics-under-HIPAA.pdf.
29

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2007); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (a) (2007).
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social media, nor information that does not identify an individual is considered
Protected Health Information. Traditionally, where the data is “publicly available,”
the research is not subject to IRB approval. Taking into consideration the amount of
data voluntarily put in the public and commercial sphere, neither the purpose of use,
nor the lack of explicit consent fall under the regulative data protections. The risk of
identification that has been determined for one particular data set in the context of a
HIPAA environment may not be appropriate for the same data set in a multiple
source environment which exceeds the scope of the HIPAA.
IV.

AN AUTHORIZATION TO USE INFORMATION FOR HEALTH-RELATED
RESEARCH

According to the Protection of Human Subjects Regulations (“Common
Rule”), in any government-funded research held in the U.S. individuals must express
their voluntarily autonomous decision that their information will be used, by giving
an informed consent based on adequate information and comprehension.30 Adequate
information should relate, among other things, to the purposes of the research, the
expected duration of the subject's participation (in Big Data research it could address
the expected duration of the use of the information), foreseeable risks, the extent, to
which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained, the
expected benefits to the subject or to others.31 Obviously, the requirement for
informed consent used in research done on human subjects is different from the
authorization to use personal data in HIPAA. 32 The Common Rule is concerned
primarily with the physical risks to humans associated with participation in a
30

45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2007).

31

Id.

See Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 10, at 164 (On informed consent vs.
patient authorization); Scott, supra note 18, at 521.
32
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research study, rather than with the protection of privacy of information, which is the
focus of the HIPAA.33 The HIPAA is concerned with the use of information. While
no prior authorization is required from the individual before information about him
is used or disclosed, any use of PHI requires an authorization (not informed
consent), which is a signed permission to allow a covered entity to use or disclose
the individual's information. 34 Individuals should be informed in advance how their
information will be used or disclosed, therefore the authorization must contain at
least one of the following elements: a description of the information to be used or
disclosed, identification of persons authorized to make the requested use or
disclosure; identification of the person(s) to whom the covered entity may make the
disclosure; a description of each purpose of the disclosure. 35 They should have the
opportunity to agree to, prohibit, or restrict the use or disclosure. 36
According to both the Common Rule, a subject may discontinue to
participate in a research at any time.37 However, individuals have the right to revoke
authorization only to the extent a covered entity has not taken action in reliance on
that authorization.38 While such revocation may affect a clinical trial and would
compromise its future, in Big Data research, the option to revoke authorization for
use and disclosure of PHI is therefore practical only before the data has been used.
The covered entity can continue using and disclosing information obtained prior to
33

Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 10, at 186.

34

45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (a)(1) (2007).

35

45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1) (2007).

36

45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2007).

37

45 CFR 46.116(a)(8). 164.508(c)(2) (2007).

38

45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(5)(i), (ii) (2007). Cf. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) art. 7(3).

99
BASSAN, THE ETHICS IN SYNTHETICS
the revocation for future research.39 This is especially alarming given that the
authorization does not have to state an expiration date or event, or limit the
permission to use certain sensitive information. 40
In particular when combined with information voluntarily provided by
users, the authorization to use personal information for Big Data research
compromises all three elements at the basis of a person’s decision to allow the use of
his or her information: information, comprehension and voluntariness. First, in most
cases, authorization to use the data from public or commercial data bases for
research is obtained when users are requested to accept a “Data Use Policy” or
“Privacy Policy” of a website, an app, or a program in which they share their
information, as a necessary condition to use the service. Information provided in
most Data Use Policies does not

comply with basic demands regarding the

necessary information given to subjects before consenting that their health-related
information will be used for research. With regards to research, Data Use Policy may
simply read as follows: “We transfer information to vendors, service providers, and
other partners who globally support our business, such as providing technical
infrastructure services, analyzing how our Services are used, measuring the
effectiveness of ads and services, providing customer service, facilitating payments,
or conducting academic research and surveys.” 41 Unlike regulation regarding
research in human subjects or even the authorization to use PHI under HIPAA,
regulation of other sources of Big Data research does not necessarily specify details
39

Withdrawal of Subjects from Research Guidance, NIH (2010),
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/guidance-on-withdrawal-ofsubject/index.html.
40

Mark A. Rothstein, HIPAA Privacy Rule 2.0: Currents in Contemporary Bioethics, 41 J.
L., MED. & ETHICS 525, 526 (2013).
41

Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/.
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about what sort of information should be given to subjects of data used for research.
They are not study specific, although information regarding the purpose of the
research may play a role when authorizing use of information, and should be part of
the information provided to subject authorizing the use of their information, and
often do not succeed explaining the risks of data sharing to the public. 42 It has been
argued that privacy policies should provide subjects providing them with detailed
information about what, why and how personal data will be collected, processed,
stored, used and in cases, disclosed.43 Moreover, in these agreements, most social
media companies retain the right to revise their Data Use Policies at any time
without providing notice to the user regarding the specific change. 44 In such cases
the user may miss the opportunity to opt out or refuse to be included.45 These
policies are difficult to understand and most people do not even read their terms.46
Usually, they serves more as liability disclaimers than as assurances of consumer
privacy, yet, by providing these notices, data owners comply, at least formally, with

42

Certain required information, such as the sort of findings or expected implications,
cannot always be foreseen in Big Data research, as statistical algorithms might find
unexpected correlations and generate unexpected implications and risks. See, e.g., Joshua
Berlinger & Maegan Vazquez, US Military Reviewing Security Practices After Fitness App
Reveals Sensitive Info, CNN DIGITAL EXPANSION SHOOT, (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/28/politics/strava-military-bases-location/index.html (recent
data about running routes, collected from the users of Strava, which bills itself as "the social
network for athletes", ended up revealing location patterns of security forces working out at
military bases in remote locations.)
43
Shara Monteleone, Addressing the Failure of Informed Consent in Online Data
Protection: Learning the Lessons from Behavior-Aware Regulation, 43 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 69, 79 (2015).
44

Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of
Use for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1086-87 (2012).
45
Lauren B. Solberg, Complying with Facebook's Terms of Use in Academic Research: A
Contractual and Ethical Perspective on Data Mining and Informed Consent, 82 UMKC L.
REV. 787, 792 (2013).
46

Monteleone, supra note 43, at 75.
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their information obligations. 47 When the subject of the information used never
learns about the research, presumed authorization can be considered a deceptive
practice.48
With regards to comprehension, most users are not aware of the multiplicity
algorithms that are gathered, stored analyzed from their data by multiple agents.49
Many data brokers combine information about habits, behaviors, or attributes that is
derived from Big Data sets based on individual’s online and offline accounts and
devices, and create predictive profiles and modeling for multiple purposes, including
commercial.50 Such profiles may be valuable to medical purposes, they also
influence employment, insurance and may serve as grounds for discriminatory
behaviors.51 Although these practices compromise the right to privacy of individuals
and bear irreversible consequences related to important aspects of their lives, current
legal framework does not address predictive models using data outside of HIPAA.
47

Id. at 80.

48

U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE MENLO REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, 11, (2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CSD-MenloPrinciplesCORE20120803.pdf.
49

Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(3); Monteleone, supra note 43, at 88.

50
Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(4-5); US Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, A review of the data broker industry: collection, use, and sale of
consumer data for marketing purposes, (2013),
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a63108f2f255b577; Satish Garla et al., What Do Your Consumer Habits Say About Your Health?
Using Third-Party Data to Predict Individual Health Risk and Costs. SAS INSTITUTE 6,
(2013), http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedings13/170-2013.pdf.
51

Ann Reilly Dowd, Protect Your Privacy: A Money Investigation Reveals the Five
Biggest Threats to Your Privacy and How You Can Safeguard Yourself Against the Most
Serious Types of Snooping, MONEY 104, 107 (1997). (In studying the privacy practices of
three hundred Fortune 500 companies, David Linowes, former chair of the President's
Commission on Privatization and the U.S. Privacy Protection Commission finds that "35% of
employers said they use personal medical information as a basis for hiring, promotion, and
firing decisions".) Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health
Records on the Workplace, (Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-1, 2010),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1531265.
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Moreover, private confidential data is traded all over the world. Some
corporation’s sole purpose is to collect such data in order to capitalize on it. 52 A
company can sell de-identified individual-level data if consumers sign the research
consent document – which 80 percent of consumers do.53 Turning profit from data
for research purpose may play a role and influence the willingness of the subject of
the data to agree to its use, thus such information should be provided to data
subjects. It is not far-fetched to assume that some users would not give authorization
to use their information for research commercial targeted advertising, purposes, even
if they have agreed that it will be used for a health-related issue.
With regards to voluntariness, while the Privacy Rule generally prohibits
covered entities from conditioning treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility on
an individual's provision of an authorization, 54 in social media as well as commercial
online activities the user gives away the right for the data when using the app. Fitbit
and Facebook are only a few examples. Most consumers are willing to pay for online
services with personal information rather than with money. 55 In these contexts,
consumers do not have the right to control what personal information is collected,
maintained, used, and shared by data brokers. It can be argued that the use of
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conditioned authorization does not meet the requirement of voluntary authorization
from subjects in health-related research.
V.

POSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS FROM THE AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT

In some cases the HIPAA’s Privacy Rule enables the covered entities to
obtain a complete waiver of the authorization requirement from an Institutional
Review Board (IRB), following three criteria56: 1) The use or disclosure of PHI
involves no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of individuals, 2) the research
could not practicably be conducted without the waiver, or 3) without access to and
use of the PHI.57 This is another expression of the ethical requirement to justify any
research by demanding that the anticipated benefits and importance of the research
will overweigh the potential harms, using the principle of proportionality. Meaning,
exceptions to the demand for individual expression of authorization are given only
when it is practically impossible to get individual authorization, and only when the
risks to the research subject are minimized and balanced with the research benefits.
Part of what the researcher will have to argue in front of the IRB is that the research
has no harmful impact.
Often, researches use the method of de-identification to show that the
research poses minimal harms on individuals whose information is being used. Data
de-identification methods refer to the process of removing or obscuring any
personally identifiable information from individuals’ records in order to minimize
the risk of unintended disclosure of identity and information. Under the Privacy
Rule, creating de-identified data or a limited data set is a health care operation of the
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covered entity and, thus, does not require an individual’s authorization, even if the
limited data set or de-identified data will function as a database for research.58
HIPAA provides two methods for de-identification.59
The Safe Harbor method specifies eighteen direct identifiers that when removed,
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule’s restrictions do not apply. 60 The de-identifying code can be
assigned to the de-identified information for purposes of re-identification, but cannot
be derived from or related to identifiers of the individual (e.g., Social Security
number).61 Specific steps and methods used to de-identify information have been
considered appropriate to protect the confidentiality of the individuals.62 However,
data de-identified using the Safe Harbor method may lack critical information
needed and become unusable for research purposes, or at least of lesser value.63 The
technical means legally required to protect individual information lack proof or
guarantees of privacy. There is an increasing area of work indicating that de-

58
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59
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identification is no-longer sufficient to protect privacy of subjects, and that data can
be re-identified and name the data subject.64 When using data from multiple sources,
there is a need to create links between different databases, protected and unprotected. As the dimensions of data increase, and the number of different variables
on each individual increases, it is more complicated to protect the identity of
participants. Studies indicate that even after the removal of the identifiers, public
data may contain personal identifying information that can lead to re-identification.65
Privacy policies apply to data collected from users information through registration
forms or cookies, and not to the content the users post. 66 When this information is
combined with de-identified data subjects can be re-identified. “The more
information available about a person, the easier it is to re-identify the person in the
future.”67 Once the information can be connected directly to data owners, even when
using encryption to protect security, the Safe Harbor Method can no longer serve as
64
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(2011); Khaled El Emam et al., A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health
Data, 6 PLOS ONE, p.e28071 (2011); Latanya Sweeney et al., Identifying Participants in the
Personal Genome Project by Name (2013),
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1304/1304.7605.pdf; Health IT Policy Committee, Health
Big Data Recommendations 1, 14 (HITPC Privacy and Security Workgroup, Aug. 16, 2015)
available at
https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/HITPC_Draft_PSWG_Big_Data_Transmittal_2
015-08-11.pdf; Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology. 2005. Statistical Policy Report on Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology, 10 , available at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/spwp22.pdf.
65
Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule , supra note 10, at 175. E.g., Dov Greenbaum et al.,
Genomics and Privacy: Implications of the New Reality of Closed Data for the Field, PLoS
Comput Biol. (2011) p.e1002278, 7; Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (not) to Protect
Genomic Data Privacy in a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-Identification to Evaluate
and Design Anonymity Protection Systems, 37 J. BIOMED INFORMATICS 179 (2004); Sarah
Zhang, Scientists Are Just as Confused about the Ethics of Big-Data Research as You,
WIRED, (May 20, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/scientists-just-confused-ethics-bigdata-research/.
66

Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(5).

67

Id. at 494(4).

106

CLEVELAND-MARSHALL JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

(Vol. 31:1)

a magic word to waive the need for authorization to use private information, or to
automatically consider the harms minimal.
Scholars approach three aspect of the harms: security of sensitive
information,68 the consequences and ramifications involved with the violation of
privacy,69 or the decision-making process of subject whose information could be
used,70 but so far the challenges is greater than the success. In a complex research
environment, regulation does not extend far enough to resolve the ethical issues
presented by advanced research technology using data retrieved from multiple
sources. Eighty percent of security executives in North America believe
conventional network security solutions are insufficient to protect their companies’
cloud storage environments, where most of the information is located. 71 It seems that
neither researchers nor users are happy with the current practice. On the one hand,
formal trials to adapt to the regulation does not necessarily bring an improvement in
terms of better awareness and compliance of the users.72 It has been argued that
researchers have reported that after the implementation of the Privacy Rule, the time
68
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70
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and cost per recruited participant became about 30% higher than before, 73 or that is
will cost the industry billions to come into compliance with the regulations. 74 Still,
this regulation cannot prevent privacy violations. On the other hand, critiques claim
that individuals are given limited control and expression of autonomy over the use of
their information due to the extended scope of authorizations, which are often
conditioned in commercial services, open ended, and based on information that is
insufficiently detailed or clear.
The second way to de-identify PHI is to have a qualified statistician
determine, using generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods,
that the risk is very small that the information could be used to identify the subject of
the information.75 The notion of expert certification is not unique to the health care
field and have been used to mitigate risk prior to sharing data. There are several
experts (usually from computer sciences) who fill similar functions.
In our view, expert certification is an aspect of accountability. Accountability is the
acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility for actions, decisions, and
policies made. Recent regulations shift the focus from the individual whose rights
are violated toward collective responsibility and solidarity, represented by the
principle of accountability. 76 With great potential of benefit comes great
responsibilities, therefore, the shift of focus lays even more duties on researchers to
73
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justify the importance of the research they are responsible for. While the “classical
rights model” recognizes individual rights but assumed state enforcement for their
violation, this flexible model is a more optimistic model, which trusts the capacity
and willingness of private organizations to effectively police themselves emphasizes
accountability and self-regulation in order to comply with legal, but also social
duties they have toward others.
The Privacy Rule does not prescribes specific safeguards, but rather,
requires that the covered entities will design their own policies and procedures. 77 It
requires that covered entities would implement safeguards to protect identified
health information, and establishes the conditions under which they can use or
disclose PHI.78 Researchers’ accountability contains private implications - on the
individual whose information it is, and social implication on society in which such
information is available. Accountable researchers must have responsibility over the
use of information in a specific research, and over the ramification of their research.
Such determination involves a person with appropriate knowledge and experience
with generally accepted statistical, scientific principles and methods. A qualified
expert may apply generally accepted statistical or scientific principles to compute the
likelihood that a record in a dataset is expected to be unique, or linkable to only one
person, within the population to which it is being compared. If an expert determines
that the risk of identification is greater than “very small”, the expert may modify the
information to mitigate the identification risk to that level, as required by the deidentification standard. The expert must reduce the risk that the data sets could be
combined with prior versions of the de-identified dataset or with other publically
77
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available datasets to identify an individual. In general, the expert will adjust certain
features or values in the data to ensure that unique, identifiable elements no longer,
or are not expected to, exist. However, there is neither a specific professional degree
or certification program for designating who is an expert at rendering health
information de-identified particular, nor a method for assessing the level of risk and
assure that it meets the “very small” level indicated by the method. This paper
explores the statistical techniques of synthetic data to minimize the risks entailed in
releasing individuals’ data for research purposes.
VI.

SYNTHETIC DATA AS A MEANS TO FULFILL ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS

The idea of synthetic (or simulated) data is introduced by Rubin.79 It is a
method of statistical disclosure limitation based on the missing data technique of
Multiple Imputation (MI).80 Synthetic data views sensitive data as missing values in
the original data (hereinafter “the observed data”). In any synthetic data set, each
data row represents a real individual. However, sensitive attributes would be fully or
partially replaced by random draws from an appropriate posterior predictive
distribution using MI techniques. In fully synthetic data, all the information is
synthesized, and in partially synthetic data only some of the information is
synthesized.
Ignoring the size of the data for a moment, let us consider micro-data as a
dataset containing information about individuals. Consider a dataset in which each
row represents a subject, and each column represents a variable. The method can
79
80
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measure different variables (age, gender, disease status, blood pressure (BP)) or
measure the same variable over time (BP pre-treatment, BP during treatment, BP
after treatment, unprotected sex, needle sharing). Essentially, our complete data will
look like a rectangle (we assume no missing data, however extensions to incomplete
data are available). The observed micro-data (D) can be considered as a random
sample from a specific population (P). One can use MI to create several populations
(m > 1, e.g., m = 10) based on the observed data. 81 Next, from each imputed
population we can draw a random sample of pre-specified size (n), which results in
m sets of complete synthetic data. 82
While Rubin introduced fully synthetic data sets where all data is replaced
with imputed data and none of the released data is real, Little proposed partially
synthetic data sets.83 In partially synthetic data the observed micro-data is still
considered a random sample from a population (P). Each partially synthetic dataset
consists of the non-sensitive data, which is the same across all m synthetic datasets,
and the imputed values of the sensitive data. The use of MI here is similar to the one
mentioned above, except that unlike fully synthetic data where all variables are
treated as potentially sensitive, in partially synthetic data the only variables
synthesized are those pre-specified. For example, if a dataset contains information
about gender, race, marital status and income, only the variable income may be
considered as sensitive, and only this variable is synthesized (m > 1) times. The m

81
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sets are then combined using the combining rules specifically appropriate to partially
synthetic datasets.84
In order to synthesize data, either fully or partially, researchers must rely on
an observed dataset, using MI.85

MI was developed originally to deal with

incomplete data. When using MI for the purpose of synthesis, we assume that either
the whole data (for fully synthetic data), or part of the data (for partially synthetic
data) is considered missing for the user. Conventional MI includes three steps:
imputation, analysis and combining results. After the imputation stage, the observed
data ceased being used and we start working in the synthetic dataset. In the
imputation stage, a statistical model is fitted to the data, and based on that model the
imputed data is generated as random draws from the data’s predictive distribution,
resulting in m complete data sets. In the analysis stage, the researcher runs a prespecified analysis on all “complete” data and saves the estimates and variances of
interest. Finally, simple arithmetic rules permit combining the m sets of results into
an aggregated final solution. The combining rules will be different depending on the
type of problem at hand. 86
The choices of imputation models are of extreme importance and have
implications on the biases involved. We would like the relationships between the
variables in the synthetic data to resemble the relationships between variables in the
observed data so that analyses will results in similar conclusions to analyses run on
the observed data. For example, consider continuous data that can be represented as
84
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a joint normal distribution, where the correlation matrix contains the information
about the relationships between the variables. If the correlation matrix of the
observed data indicates high correlation between two variables, we expect the
correlation matrix from the synthetic data to represent similar high correlation as
well. But if the models are wrong, and the imputation model neglects to control
some variables of interest, the correlations of these variables with others will
diminish to zero, which means results are not accurate.
As we move from conventional size micro-data to Big Data, the thought
process stays the same, but the complication due to the size of the data needs to be
taken into consideration. When considering Big Data, it is not always clear if fully
synthetic data is plausible to construct. The main advantage of partially synthetic
data over fully synthetic data is the ability to deal with a larger amount of data and
more simplified statistical models for the imputation models. Mathematically, it is
simpler to build a model for the partially synthetic data compared with fully
synthetic data due to the size of the models and the datasets in place. The larger the
model is, the more parameters there are to estimate, and the complexity increases
dramatically.
VII.

A NEW RISK-BENEFIT BALANCE

Using synthetic data enables researchers to balance potential benefits from
data analytics for health-related research with methods of protecting the privacy of
data subjects. The procedure of synthetic data is based on the premise that releasing
the data will maintain the privacy of the individuals in the sample. Synthetic data can
rely on databases from one source or several sources, with different scopes of
privacy protections, because eventually in this approach, although the analyses on
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these datasets will represent the population it was sampled from, all variables in the
dataset are synthesized. Meaning, on the one hand individuals’ information is not
being disclosed, and on the other, the scientific and social benefits are maximized.
The confidentiality level is slightly different in each method (fully or partially
synthesized data).87 Utility is maximized when all synthetic data is identical to the
original data (no noise was added), as there is no actual variability between observed
and synthetic data. These datasets are highly useful for analysts, but pose great risks
because they may contain individuals’ sensitive information. As the variability
between the synthetic dataset and the original dataset increases, the confidentiality
increases and the utility decreases. When using fully synthetized data, the data
released represents data of individual in the observed database, but effectively it is
simulated data, not the actual data of that individual. The data analyzed is only a
hypothesized representation of individuals, therefore the privacy of actual
individuals is preserved. Since all the data released is synthetic, fully synthetic data
can therefore be considered more secure. Partially synthetized data still contains
some of the information of de-identified individuals, thus the risk in disclosure of
information is higher in comparison to fully synthetic data that do not contain any
individuals’ real data. However, all the sensitive information for these individuals is
synthesized, therefore even in partially synthetic data, the ability to connect these
data to an individual is reduced dramatically in comparison with the risks in using
the observed data. For example, age, gender and race are not synthesized but HIV
87
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status, and related biomarkers are synthesized. It does not seem like the use of
personal information to create a synthetic data can differently satisfy the
"impracticably to achieve individual consent” required for a waiver than any other
use in Big Data research. The requirements of informed consent remain the same, as
the process is done after the information has been shared. However, individuals will
most likely be more willing to allow the use of their information for a synthesized
database, relatively to non-synthesized one, because the risks are lower.
While this paper focuses on potential harms that are entangled in healthrelated research in Big Data research, the equilibrium between risks and benefits
from the research begs wide accessibility to Big Data sets that may be useful for
future research. There is extensive motivation of the government and industrial
officials to gather and extract maximal value from existing data for public good, and
facilitate access to available resources that can be utilized at no risk to individuals.
Researchers receiving federal funding often have to submit their data to a public data
bank, such as the National Institutes of Health’s database of Genotypes and
Phenotypes (dbGaP), which offers other researchers access to data for future work
for little to no fee.88 Other public and private funds go into the collection and
maintenance of databases, which become less accessible, reducing potential benefit.
Given the value large scale information holds, Big Data, broadly defined, is
producing increased institutional powers for those who own them. At the moment,
large data companies create monopolies. Commercial companies do not necessarily
have an obligation to make their data available to others, as they do not follow the
same policy regarding their information. They have complete control over what they
share, whom they share it with, and for what purpose. Private companies may restrict
88
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access to their data entirely or offer small data sets only to well-resourced bodies.89
Limited access creates a digital barrier between those who have tools and access to
data and those who do not.90 Moreover, when those without access can neither
reproduce nor evaluate the methodological claims of those who have privileged
access, the validity of the research is affected. It may also affect the areas and agenda
of future research: those privileged enough to get access to proprietary data sets will
not risk their access being cut and chose topics that are appealing to the database
owners. Less accessibility therefore compromises potential benefit from research
that is not necessarily favorable to the interests of database owners and minimizes,
rather than maximizes, the benefit in research in Big Data. Synthetic datasets may
improve this situation. Owner of the data can choose whether to give access to data
whether it is synthesized or not. However, they are more likely to be willing to share
synthesized data, because the risks involved with sharing such data are lower.
Moreover, when using synthetic data, researchers’ access to data from
which they can conduct a variety of secondary analyses, increases dramatically. In
order to avoid privacy infringement, commonly the owners (data collection agencies)
release some summary statistics of the data (such as tables of counts, means,
variances, correlations, etc.). This is inefficient to other researchers since they cannot
conduct most secondary analyses using only summary statistics. In particular, if only
summary statistics are reported, results such as regression coefficients, odds ratios
89
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and other frequently used parameters are not possible to obtain and may minimize
potential benefits from existing databases, rather than maximizing them. The main
advantage in synthetic data is allowing the use of extensive information, unrelated to
actual individuals, across a wide range of research settings and substantive areas.
Each synthetic dataset can be analyzed based on the common complete data
statistical analysis procedure (i.e. regression) required by the secondary researchers.
For example, secondary researchers who obtain the m sets of synthetic data might
wish to analyze the role of some of the variables in a new regression. The results
from each dataset are saved and combined for a final result taking into account the
fact that the data were synthesized.91 If the methodology used for imputation is
general enough, (almost) any statistical procedure will be applicable for secondary
users and there are no limitations to the specific secondary statistical analysis
researchers can use.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Health-related research in Big Data holds not only a promise, but
also a peril as a result of privacy violations, particularly when data is used from
multiple resources. Neither regulatory nor security solutions adequately administrate
risks involved in health-related research that relies on traditional health-related data
as well as non-traditional sources, in particular when research combines health
related and public data voluntarily provided by users.
This paper explores the statistical techniques of synthetic data to minimize
the risks entailed in releasing individuals’ data for research purposes. The method of
synthetic data is not an exclusive method to conduct research, but demonstrates the
91
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importance in using multi-disciplinary scientific methods in the design and analysis
of health-related research in Big Data. Statistical models and methodologies of
analysis still leave many open questions and may require adaptation according to the
social, medical, financial context of each source, similar to the diverse
methodological and analytical approaches used in social science. If not adapted, we
risk misunderstanding the results and as a result misallocate important public
resources. This is true for any statistical analyses regardless to the database in
question. While this model is imperfect, when dealing with multiple sources in
health-related research, it addresses many of the challenges posed by the Safe Harbor
method of de-identification in a better way, increasing privacy and accessibility to
usable useful data.
The multi-disciplinary method may serve as a basis for coherent regulation,
complying with the principle of researcher’s accountability infused with technology.
Where known harms can be minimized and benefits increased, it may be
unjustifiable to conduct research without using such methods. We join the call to
develop social media policies pursuant to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 92 as well as an
ethical Big Data policy, which will encompass information rules that manage the
appropriate flows of information in ethical ways. 93
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